The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
The recent financial crisis has made obvious the need for models of financial stability. These three lectures will cover recent advancements in the modeling of crisis episodes, with particular emphasis on the use of continuous-time methods which make these models more tractable. Useful background reading includes the following
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
The recent financial crisis has made obvious the need for models of financial stability. These three lectures will cover recent advancements in the modeling of crisis episodes, with particular emphasis on the use of continuous-time methods which make these models more tractable. Useful background reading includes the following
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
These lectures will cover two topics. The first is contingent capital in the form of debt that converts to equity when a bank
nears financial distress. These instruments offer a potential solution to the problem of banks that are too big to fail by
providing a credible alternative to a government bail-out. Their properties are, however, complex. I will discuss models for the analysis of contingent capital with particular emphasis on their incentive effects and the design of the conversion trigger. The second topic in these lectures is the problem of quantifying contagion and amplification in financial networks. In particular, I will focus on bounding the potential impact of network effects under the realistic condition that detailed information on the structure of the network is unavailable
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
The lender of last resort: An analysis of the economics and politics of banking crises, and episodes of bail-outs of
failing financial institutions.
Rochet Vives (2004) “The Lender of last Resort: was Bagehot right after all?” JEEA, 6, 1116-1147, reprinted in Rochet J.C. (2008) “Why are there so many banking crises?, Princeton University Press, chapter 2
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
I will begin with an overview of the purpose and structure of OTC markets, and how they can be a source of systemic risk.
This will be followed by a brief review of search-based theories of trade and information sharing in OTC markets. Then I will turn to theories and evidence regarding the use of collateral, the role of central clearing, and failure management. The failure management topic will finish with a model of the efficient application of legal stays that could be imposed on OTC contracts at the point of bankruptcy or administrative failure resolution. These stays can yield effective payment or settlement priority to OTC contracts. Stays can be efficient, or not efficient, depending on the setting. The affected OTC contracts include derivatives, repurchase agreements, securities lending agreements, and clearing agreements. I assume a basic knowledge of game theory and of measure-theoretic probability theory, particularly counting processes with an intensity.
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
Understanding the mechanisms underlying systemic risk requires to change the traditional focus of risk modelling and examine the link between the structure of the financial system and its stability, with a focus on contagion mechanisms which may lead to large scale instabilities in the financial system. Some channels of contagion which have played an important role in past crises are: insolvency contagion through counterparty exposures, withdrawal of liquidity in funding channels and price-mediated contagion through fire sales of assets.
We review some recent work on the mechanisms underlying these channels of contagion, with a focus on the nature of the 'network' underlying each contagion mechanism and the implications of these results for the monitoring and regulation of systemic risk. In particular, we will attempt to illustrate the importance of the ineraction between these various channels and how this interaction may undermine regulatory efforts focussed only on a single mechanism.
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
Understanding the mechanisms underlying systemic risk requires to change the traditional focus of risk modelling and examine the link between the structure of the financial system and its stability, with a focus on contagion mechanisms which may lead to large scale instabilities in the financial system. Some channels of contagion which have played an important role in past crises are: insolvency contagion through counterparty exposures, withdrawal of liquidity in funding channels and price-mediated contagion through fire sales of assets.
We review some recent work on the mechanisms underlying these channels of contagion, with a focus on the nature of the 'network' underlying each contagion mechanism and the implications of these results for the monitoring and regulation of systemic risk. In particular, we will attempt to illustrate the importance of the ineraction between these various channels and how this interaction may undermine regulatory efforts focussed only on a single mechanism.
The Economics and Mathematics of Systemic Risk and Financial Networks
Abstract:
Understanding the mechanisms underlying systemic risk requires to change the traditional focus of risk modelling and examine the link between the structure of the financial system and its stability, with a focus on contagion mechanisms which may lead to large scale instabilities in the financial system. Some channels of contagion which have played an important role in past crises are: insolvency contagion through counterparty exposures, withdrawal of liquidity in funding channels and price-mediated contagion through fire sales of assets.
We review some recent work on the mechanisms underlying these channels of contagion, with a focus on the nature of the 'network' underlying each contagion mechanism and the implications of these results for the monitoring and regulation of systemic risk. In particular, we will attempt to illustrate the importance of the ineraction between these various channels and how this interaction may undermine regulatory efforts focussed only on a single mechanism.
Hilbert’s Tenth Problem asked for an algorithm that, given a multivariable polynomial equation with integer coefficients, would decide whether there exists a solution in integers. Around 1970, Matiyasevich, building on earlier work of Davis, Putnam, and Robinson, showed that no such algorithm exists. However, the answer to the analogous question with integers replaced by rational numbers is still unknown, and there is not even agreement among experts as to what the answer should be.